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ABSTRACT
A Quantitative Study of the Deployment of the
Sender Policy Framework
Eunice Zsu-Chnn Tan
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Email has become a standard form of communication between businesses. With the
prevalent use of email as a form of communication between businesses and customers, phishing
emails have emerged as a popular social engineering approach. With phishing, attackers
trick users into divulging their personal information through email spoofing. Thus, it is
imperative to verify the sender of an email. Anti-spoofing mechanisms such as the Sender
Policy Framework (SPF) have been developed as the first line of defense against spoofing by
validating the source of an email as well as the presenting options of how to handle emails
that fail to validate. However, deployment of SPF policies and SPF validation remains low.
To understand the cost and benefit of deploying SPF, we have developed metrics to quantify
its deployment and maintenance complexity through modeling. Our approach provides a
way to visualize the SPF record of a given domain through the use of a graph. Using the
developed model, we applied the metrics to both the current and historical SPF policy for
the Alexa Top Sites for empirical study and historical trend analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Email has become one of the standard tools for interaction between businesses and
their customers. The number of email accounts is expected to grow from 3.1 billion in 2011
to 4.1 billion in 2015, with an estimated of 215 billion email messages were sent per day in
2016 [11]. With the prevalent use of email as a form of communication between businesses
and their customers, phishing is naturally one of the popular social engineering approaches
used by attackers to trick users into revealing important information, such as credentials.
In a typical phishing setting, an attacker sends an email appearing to be from a legitimate
organization, seeking to lure receivers into clicking a hyperlink in the email that brings them
to a counterfeit website designed to steal their credentials. Phishing has since evolved to a
more devilish variation in which users systems are infected with malware through opening
an email attachment [4]. Malware, which used to be merely a nuisance that caused system
malfunction, has now adopted a more malicious role of going into stealth mode with the
intent of causing either financial damage to the users or turning their systems into “bots”.
According to the phishing activity trends reports by the Anti-Phishing Working Group
(APWG) APW [1], there was a 397% increase in the number of unique reported phishing cases
from 284,445 in 2011 to 1,413,978 in 2015. An average of 415 brands per month from various
industry sectors, such as ISP, financial and retail, were hijacked by phishing campaigns in the
same year. The 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report [14] stated that as many as
23% of the recipients opened phishing messages, and 11% clicked on an email attachment. If
trends continue, an estimated 325,214 (23% of 1,413,978) users will be tricked into opening a
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phishing email, and approximately 155,537 (11% of 1,413,978) will open phishing attachments,
causing their systems to be infected with malware.
Phishing remains a successful form of social engineering attack since users cannot
diﬀerentiate between a phishing and a genuine email. Both appear in the users mailbox
though normal communication infrastructure [13]. To exacerbate the problem, Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the protocol designed to carry email around the globe, does not
inherently prevent false impersonation or detect malicious intent. Another contributing factor
to the rise in phishing is the role of humans: it is easier to breach a system by penetrating
the weakest defense, humans, by exploiting trust [3].
The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is an open standard anti-spoofing [12] protocol
developed in 2003. With SPF, a domain designates authorized email senders such that email
recipients can detect illegitimate senders. Major email providers (Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo!,
etc.) have implemented SPF, yet only 47% of the Alexa Top Million1 deployed SPF [6] in
spite of SPF being the de facto standard [15] for email source authentication.
Does the cost of implementing and maintaining an SPF record outweigh the benefits
of domain protection? Can SPF be eﬀectively deployed by organizations that use thirdparty email providers such as Google or Hotmail? Does the use of a third-party email
provider complicate the deployment of SPF? We attempt to answer these critical questions
by developing a model to analyze an SPF policy and quantify its complexity by applying
metrics associated with that model. We apply our methodology to over 500,000 of the Alexa
Top Sites, from both a current and a historical perspective. We observed an increase in the
use of third-party organizations contributing to SPF policies in the past seven years. We also
observed over this period an increase in IP addresses authorized to send email for a given
domain. IPv4 remained the dominant protocol used among the SPF policies we analyzed,
both in the present and historically. We also learned that 15.28% of the SPF policies we
1

List of popular Internet websites rank according to the Alexa Traﬃc Rank algorithms.
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analyzed can be evaluated without incurring additional DNS lookup beyond that required for
the initial SPF policy.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 includes a brief
description of SPF. Chapter 3 gives a summary of previous work in this area. Chapter 4
describes the methodology in model and metrics development. Chapter 5 presents the results
of the empirical studying. Chapter 6 makes recommendation and concludes the research.
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Chapter 2
Background

The main purpose of SMTP is to provide a simple, yet realizable transport protocol
to act as an avenue for an email to be electronically transferred from sender to a receiver.
SMTP gives the sender the discretion to identify itself by specifying their email address using
the MAIL FROM identity section. This discretion is useful under certain scenarios, such as
creating a mailing list where emails are sent by an authorized third-party vendor on behalf of
a legitimate user. However, this flexibility also creates opportunity for abuse.
Attackers can exploit the insecurity of the MAIL FROM identity by impersonating
someone else. Figure 2.1 shows an example of such exploitation; an email was sent via SMTP
from a server within BYUs computer science network, yet the MAIL FROM indicates that
the email is from gmail.com.
To counter email spoofing, SPF was developed to verify the legitimacy of the domain
specified in the MAIL FROM identity by having the mail receiver validate the IP address of
the received mail against a list of authorized hosts obtained from the domain in MAIL FROM
identity. For SPF to work eﬀectively, 1) the domain must publish the list of IP addresses

Figure 2.1: Sample Capture of a Typical SMTP Communication
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authorized to send via its SPF policy, 2) the policy must be validated by the SPF validator
of the mail receiver, and 3) the SPF policy must adhere to the SPF proposed standard.
When properly deployed, SPF helps detect email spoofing. In the case of the example
from Figure 2.1, the SPF validator extracts the domain portion of the MAIL FROM identity
— gmail.com. It then retrieves the SPF policy for gmail.com, parses and evaluates the
policy, then checks the sender’s IP address against those specified by the policy. Because the
IP address of the sender doesn’t match any of those listed by the policy, the email is marked
as suspicious.
To deploy SPF as specified in RFC 7208 [10], the system administrator for a domain
creates an SPF policy and publishes it as a Domain Name System (DNS) record of type
TXT (See Section 2.1 for background information on the DNS). However, SPF is not simply
a list of IP addresses. It is composed of various terms, known as mechanisms and modifiers 1 ,
this constitute a recipe for obtaining a complete list of authorized hosts. RFC 7208 is the
proposed SPF standard describing the guidelines for operational processing, evaluation, and
error-handling of these mechanisms and modifiers. A published SPF policy follows this
syntax:
"v=spf1 qualifier [mechanism] |

modifier"

where v=spf1 stands for SPF version one. There are altogether four qualifiers, eight
mechanisms, and two modifiers. The mechanisms of the SPF policy provide instructions to
the SPF validator to take actions such as fetching mail exchange (MX) records to ultimately
derive the set of authorized IP addresses via additional DNS lookups. A match is found when
a derived IP address matches the sender’s IP address.
RFC 7208 dictates that the mechanisms be evaluated in turn from left to right, until
the evaluation either returns a match or an exception. A mechanism can be prefixed with
a qualifier and the qualifier value acts as the determining factor for the final return result
to the SPF validator; e.g. a qualifier value of “pass” with a match condition will deem the
1

See www.openspf.org/SPF Record Syntax for a comprehensive SPF syntax listing
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sender’s IP address as valid. The default qualifier for any mechanism not having one explicit
stated is “pass.” A modifier is an optional term that provides additional information to the
SPF validator, such as fetching an SPF policy from another domain for further processing or
tailoring its rejection message after policy evaluation. See section 4 for further information
on qualifiers, mechanisms and modifiers.

Figure 2.2: Reference Domain
Mechanisms a, mx and ptr can be either paired with or without a domain. On the
other hand, the include mechanism and redirect modifier must always be suﬃxed by a
domain. Any DNS query issues that come from the processing of mechanisms or modifiers
suﬃxed with a domain must use the reference domain for its lookup. Mechanisms without
the suﬃx will default to the current domain which is the base domain until it is replaced by
the occurrence of a reference domain.
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2.1

DNS

The architectural design of SPF is based largely on the DNS infrastructure. Thus, in this
section, we will introduce the role and functionality of the DNS to increase the understanding
of SPF and its policy processing.
DNS is the phone book for the Internet. The DNS is used to resolve human-friendly
domain names to computer-readable IP addresses. The DNS infrastructure consists of: 1)
the authoritative nameservers, which contain the domain-to-IP address mapping in the form
of a DNS record; 2) the clients, which request the IP address of a particular domain name;
and 3) the recursive resolver that queries the authoritative nameservers responsible for the
domain name that is being translated.
There are many types of DNS records. We discuss four primary types that are related
to our research: 1) the A record, which contains the IPv4 address for a domain name; 2) the
AAAA record, which contains the IPv6 address for a domain name; 3) the MX record, which
contains the domain names of mail servers for a given domain; and 4) the TXT record, which
contains arbitrary text and, among other things, is used for declaring an SPF policy. A typical
DNS lookup consists of a domain name and the record of interest: e.g., example.com/AAAA.
Even though the DNS works behind the scenes, the productivity of the entire Internet
is dependent on the performance of the DNS infrastructure [9]. A simple DNS lookup might
turn into a recursive query requiring multiple queries by the recursive resolver. Thus, any
excessive or unnecessary DNS lookups have the potential to slow down the application relying
on the lookups. To conserve DNS resources, caution should be exercised in the design of an
SPF policy, especially those policies comprising of mechanisms and modifiers that use DNS
lookups to derive the underlying IP addresses for the SPF validation process.
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2.2

Common SPF Policies

For the purpose of understanding the work herein proposed, we will discuss some of
the commonly used SPF mechanisms using the following two policies as an example.

imaal6.com.

IN TXT "v=spf1 a mx include:imaal3.com ∼all"

• a - Expands to all IP addresses found in the A or AAAA DNS records corresponding to
the domain. Since no domain name is explicitly referenced here, the domain name is
implicitly imaal6.com. The A record contains IPv4 addresses, and the AAAA record
contains IPv6 addresses.
• mx - Expands to the IP addresses corresponding to the MX records that are associated
with the domain. Since no domain name is explicitly referenced here, the domain name
is implicitly imaal6.com.

• include:imaal3.com - Indicates that the SPF policy for the reference domain
imaal3.com should be looked up and included for further evaluation. Refer to section
2.3 for the policy processing related to include mechanism.

• ∼all - Used as the default mechanism at the end of the policy. “∼” is the qualifier
that stands for soft fail; if validation fails, the mail should still be accepted but flagged.

imaal7.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 -all"
• -all - When used with the - qualifier (fail), no IP addresses are designated as authorized
senders. Thus, no email should be sent from this domain.
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2.3

SPF Policy Processing

To achieve our goals, we must understand the underlying procedure involved in processing
an SPF policy, as outlined in RFC 7208. To illustrate the complexity of processing an SPF
policy, we have constructed a hypothetical spoofing scenario where an attacker sends an email
to company B, spoofing company A’s domain. The following example details company A’s
SPF policy and the steps taken by company B to verify the sender IP against company A by
using its SPF policy:
companyA.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 include:a.companyA.com
include:b.companyA.com -all"
a.companyA.com.

IN TXT

"v = spf1 a -all"

b.companyA.com.

IN TXT

"v = spf1 ip4:192.168.23.5 -all"

1. An attacker sends an email to company B, spoofing company A’s domain.
2. Company B invokes its SPF validator to validate the received email.
3. The SPF validator issues a DNS lookup of type TXT to query for company A’s SPF
policy and begins to evaluate the returned policy from left to right.
4. The SPF validator issues a DNS lookup of type TXT to query for the SPF policy of
reference domain a.companyA.com.
5. The SPF validator processes the returned SPF policy and issues a DNS query for the A
record corresponding to a.companyA.com.
6. The SPF validator checks the sender IP against the returned IP address. Pass if
matched, otherwise move to step 7.
7. The SPF validator issues a type TXT DNS lookup to query for the SPF policy of
reference domain b.companyA.com.
8. The SPF validator checks the sender’s IP address against the IPv4: 192.168.23.5. Pass
if matched, otherwise return hard fail.
9

Figure 2.3: Example of include Mechanism
Company A uses the include mechanism in their SPF policy, which introduces
the possibility of up to three DNS lookups beyond the original lookup to find its primary
policy: 1) to obtain the SPF policy of a.companyA.com ; 2) to obtain the SPF policy of
b.companyA.com; and 3) to get the IP address from the A record for a.companyA.com.
As observed from the example, the include mechanism has the potential to introduce
multiple DNS lookups and trigger a recursive evaluation.

10

Chapter 3
Previous Work

Even though there are benefits in implementing anti-spoofing mechanisms, there is
generally a lack of incentives by the organizations in implementing the necessary protocols to
secure their emails and reduce phishing. Anh et al. [2] attribute the low SPF adoption rates
to philosophical issues. Network administrators exhibit little desire to work on something that
only benefits others. They propose overcoming the philosophical issues by auto generating
SPF records using email domain and IP information from email service providers. Anh et al.
presented a rather interesting idea to build a comprehensive list of SPF policies for all the
domains in the world, for which historical emails from every single email provider in the
world would be needed. Dalkılıç and Sipahi [5], propose to automatically create SPF policies
with a strict rejection model to circumvent the low adoption rates and increase the usefulness
of SPF.
The non-existence of any inherent security for SMTP has opened the door for phishing
abuse. This abuse has led to undertakings by diﬀerent communities to propose, build and
improve various SMTP security extensions such as STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
Durumeric et al. [6] has analyzed the global adoption rates of STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM and
DMARC, while Görling [8] has studied the global adoption rates of SPF only. Görling, oﬀers
some explanations for the mild SPF adoption and encourage further adoption by discussing
SPF merits.
Foster et al. [7] conduct a measurement study on the email security protocols supported
by the major email providers such as hotmail.com, gmail.com and others. The security
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protocols being studied are DNSSEC, TLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC. The study reveals
that the support of SPF is common among the major email providers, however only a relative
handful adhere to the RFC7208 recommendation of rejecting any mail that fails the strict
rejection policy of “-all.”
Our work further studies SPF by developing a model and metrics for assessing the
complexity of an SPF policy. We apply our model and metrics to published SPF policies
to learn whether policy complexity might be a hindrance in SPF deployment. We aim to
improve the SPF adoption rates by equipping the domains with the methodology and tools
presented in this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Methodology

An eﬀective and eﬃcient SPF deployment lies in the appropriate use of SPF terms
to create policies that accurately capture all the legitimate email senders for a domain and
the conscientious eﬀort to conserve DNS queries through the use of SPF terms. Thus, the
complexity of an SPF policy is based on the number and nature of DNS queries required by
an SPF validator to find a matching IP address for the email sender.
However, we have no idea how simple or how complex an SPF can be by simply
looking at the policy; An SPF policy can recursively include other SPF policies via the use of
the include mechanism. The include mechanism introduces administrative flexibility by
allowing the administrator to designate an independent third-party email provider such as
Gmail, Hotmail or Yahoo!, within an SPF policy. Paradoxically, this flexibility increases the
policy complexity beyond the initial one-liner sentence.
In view of that, we developed a model to capture the complexity of an SPF policy
by detailing the steps involved for the evaluation of each SPF term in the policy for the
derivation of the IP address. The qualifier, an optional value, is only applicable after the
derivation of IP addresses. Thus, it is irrelevant to our study and will not be part of our
model. In addition, metrics were derived from the developed model to quantify the policy
complexity. We use these metrics to measure the eﬃciency of the SPF policy. Refer to section
4.1 for model development and section 4.2 for the metrics and their uses.
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4.1

Model Development

We use SPF d to denote the SPF policy of a given domain, and we model SPF d as a tree data
structure because a tree intuitively depicts the recursive nature of the process associated
with the evaluation of SPF d . We define the tree associated with SPF d as:

Gd = (V, E)

(4.1)

Gd stands for the directed, acyclic graph model of a given domain. V stands for the
set of nodes that represent the evaluated SPF terms. E is the set of edges that connect the
nodes in the tree. The edges represent the actions taken by an SPF validator during the
evaluation of SPF terms. The positioning of nodes in the tree describes the ancestor and
descendant relationships in the hierarchy of Gd .
4.1.1

Adding Nodes and Edges

SPF terms are the building block of Gd . We will describe the technicality of each term and
the way they are added as nodes and edges to Gd .
Mechanism all
This is the catch-all mechanism which appears at the end of a policy to instruct the
SPF validator to match any sender’s IP address that fails to match any previous IP address
in the policy. This mechanism does not require a validator to issue any DNS lookups nor
does it specify any authorized IP addresses. Thus, it is not reflected in Gd .
Mechanism ip4 and ip6
The ip4 and ip6 mechanisms specify actual IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (or ranges),
respectively. These two mechanisms can be used by an SPF validator for direct matching
without the need for further processing (i.e. ,with DNS lookups). For policy u ∈ V , with ip4
or ip6 mechanism having value v, v is added to Gd with the creation of edge (u,v).
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Mechanism a
This mechanism requires the SPF validator to issue a DNS lookup of type A or AAAA
to find the IP address of the current or reference domain. For policy u ∈ V , with an a
mechanism having value v :
1. v is added to the graph with the creation of edge (u, v); and
2. nodes are created for each of the n IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to which v resolves,
w1 , w2 , ..., wn , and edges are added to connect each to v : (v, wi )∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Mechanism mx
This mechanism requires the SPF validator to issue a DNS lookup of type MX to look
for the MX records of the current or reference domain, as well as the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
corresponding to each MX record returned. For policy u ∈ V , with an mx mechanism having
value v :
1. v is added to the graph with the creation of edge (u, v);
2. nodes are created for each of the n domain names resulting from the DNS lookup of type
MX for v, w1 , w2 , ..., wn , and edges are added to connect each to v : (v, wi )∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
and
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, wi is resolved to its m corresponding IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and edges
are drawn to connect each wi : (wi , xj )∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Mechanism ptr
This mechanism performs a reverse DNS lookup for the corresponding domain of
the sender’s IP address, followed by a DNS lookup of type A or AAAA of the corresponding
returned domain name to match against the sender’s IP address. Since this mechanism
requires the sender’s IP address, which is not known until the time of validation, nodes and
edges are created as placeholders only. For policy u ∈ V , with a ptr mechanism, assuming a
sender’s IP address v :
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1. v is added to the graph with the creation of edge (u, v);
2. a single node, w, is created to represent the A and AAAA record lookup of v, and it is
connected to the graph using edge (u, w); and
3. two nodes, x1 and x2 , are added to the graph, labeled with arbitrary IPv4 and IPv6
address, connected by edges (w, x1 ) and (w, x2 ) respectively.
Mechanism include and Modifier redirect
These two mechanisms instruct the SPF validator to obtain the SPF policy of the
reference domain. The redirect modifier, similar to include mechanism, was created to
allow an organization to apply the same SPF policy across multiple domains. Thus, it will
be handled like the include mechanism for the purpose of building Gd . For policy u ∈ V ,
with an include mechanism or redirect modifier having value v, v is added to the graph
with the creation of edge (u, v).
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4.1.2

Generating Gd

We developed software to take an SPF policy from the DNS and construct a tree following
the model described in this section Our software was developed in Python and used the pyspf
and pygraphviz libraries. In the near future, we plan to make the code available under an
open source license.
We present two examples. One is a contrived SPF policy, example.com, and the
other is the live policy for the domain name idea.rs. We refer to these examples when
describing the metrics presented hereafter. The policies and graphs, SPF example.com , SPF idea.rs ,
Gexample.com and Gidea.rs are shown in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 respectively.
As seen in Figure 4.1, there are four subtrees in Gexample.com stemming from its
root. Each corresponds to a term of SPF example.com : a, mx, include, and ptr. Theoretically, each subtree constitutes a potential path that an SPF validator might follow
for its validation. Each edge represents the action triggered by an SPF term, and each
node — except the root and the leaf nodes represents a DNS query being issued. These
DNS lookups are: 1) a DNS query for the A record of domain name example.com; 2) a
DNS query for the MX record of example.com; 3) a DNS query for the A/AAAA record of
domain name mail20.example.com; 4) a DNS query for the SPF policy of domain name
example2.com; 5) a DNS query for the SPF policy of domain name example3.com;
6) a placeholder representing the reverse DNS query for the sender’s IP address; and 7) a
placeholder representing the DNS query for the A/AAAA record corresponding to the returned
reverse DNS response. Finally, each leaf node of Gexample.com contains the authorized hosts of
SPF example.com .
There are three subtrees in Gidea.rs (Figure 4.2) stemming from the root node. Each
corresponds to one of the three terms in SPF example.com , namely the include and two ip4
mechanism of SPF example.com . The DNS lookups for SPF idea.rs represented in the nodes of
Gidea.rs are: 1) a DNS query for the SPF policy of domain name agrokor.hr; 2) a DNS
query for the MX record of the domain name agrokor.hr; 3) a DNS query for the A/AAAA
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records of domain name muhlo.agrokor.hr; and 4) a DNS query for the A/AAAA record
of domain name lobel.agrokor.hr.
Domains
example.com
example.com
example.com
example.com
mail20.example.com
mail20.example.com
example2.com
example3.com

Type
TXT
A
AAAA
MX
A
AAAA
TXT
TXT

Value
“v=spf1 a mx include: example2.com ptr -all”
192.0.2.10
2001:db8::10
mail20.example.com
192.0.2.20
2001:db8::20
“v=spf1 redirect= example3.com all”
“v=spf1 ip4:192.0.2.30 all”

Table 4.1: SPF data of example.com

example.com
(1)a
example.com
AAAA
2001:db8::10

(2)mx
example.com

A

(3)include

(4)ptr

example2.com

mx

192.0.2.10

mail20.example.com
AAAA
2001:db8::20

Reverse DNS Lookup

redirect

a

example3.com

A

a lookup

ip4

192.0.2.20

192.0.2.30

A
192.0.2.1

AAAA
2001:db8::1

Figure 4.1: Gexample.com
Domains
idea.rs
agrokor.hr

Type
TXT
TXT

agrokor.hr
muhlo.agrokor.hr
muhlo.agrokor.hr
lobel.agrokor.hr
lobel.agrokor.hr

MX
A
AAAA
A
AAAA

Value
“v=spf1 include:agrokor.hr ip4:194.126.214.242 ip4:213.186.0.5 -all”
“v=spf1 +mx ip4:194.126.214.229 ip4:194.126.214.197 ip4:194.126.214.232
ip4:213.186.0.5 -all”
muhlo.agrokor.hr, lobel.agrokor.hr
194.126.214.160
Not available
194.126.214.161
Not available

Table 4.2: SPF data of idea.rs
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idea.rs
(1)include
agrokor.hr
mx
agrokor.hr
mx
muhlo.agrokor.hr
A
194.126.214.160

194.126.214.229

ip4

ip4

194.126.214.197

(2)ip4
(3)ip4

ip4

194.126.214.242

ip4

194.126.214.232

213.186.0.5

mx
lobel.agrokor.hr
A
194.126.214.161

Figure 4.2: Gidea.rs
4.2

Metrics

As observed in Figure 4.1, the model not only provides the user with a visual representation
but captures the essence of its SPF policy. Thus, we use Gd to derive meaningful metrics
to help us quantify SPF policy complexity by answering questions such as: 1) what is the
total number of DNS lookups required by the policy; 2) how many IP addresses are listed;
and 3) what is the prevalence of SPF policy outsourcing. Answering these questions will
aid in quantifying the level of control an organization has in its SPF policy, quantifying the
complexity of an organization’s email infrastructure, and assessing the eﬀectiveness of SPF
deployment as a function of its complexity.
4.2.1

IP Nodes

The leaf nodes of Gd constitute all the authorized IP addresses of SPFd against which an
SPF validator can match sender IP addresses. A diverse IP address range or a large pool of
the IP address space might imply higher administrative costs due to the time and eﬀort put
in by the network administrator to enumerate and maintain the IP addresses.
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4.2.2

Minimum DNS Lookups (min DNS)

The SPF specification indicates that an SPF validator should evaluate the terms of a given SPF
policy in order from left to right [RFC 7208]. For many validators, this involves performing
DNS lookups on demand, as the policy is evaluated. Consider the DNS lookups required
for SPF idea.rs (refer to Figure 4.3 with nodes highlighted in red). An RFC 7208-compliant
SPF validator will: 1) evaluate the first term of SPF idea.rs , the include mechanism,
and issue a DNS query for the SPF policy of agrokor.hr; 2) evaluate the first term of
SPF agrokor.hr , the mx mechanism, and issue a DNS query for the MX record for agrokor.hr;
and 3) evaluate the first returned MX record of agrokor.hr and issue a DNS query for the
A record corresponding to muhlo.agrokor.hr, one of the MX records for agrokor.hr.
Thus, the total number of DNS lookups just to evaluate the sender’s IP address against the
first authorized host in SPF idea.rs is 3. We refer to this as the minimum DNS lookups.
The minimum DNS lookups is derived by traversing the left-most nodes of Gd ,
subtracting the root and left-most leaf nodes, as shown in Eq 4.2

Gd min DN S = |Gd left-most nodes| − 1(root node) − |Gd left-most leaf nodes|

Figure 4.3: Gidea.rs
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(4.2)

4.2.3

Maximum DNS Lookups (max DNS)

This metric captures all the possible DNS lookups that an SPF validator might need to
issue for a given SPF d . This is the upper bound of DNS lookups, supposing the sender’s
IP address never matches any of the authorized IP addresses. For example, we consider all
the possible DNS lookups by an SPF validator for SPF idea.rs (refer to Figure 4.4 with nodes
highlighted in red): 1) a DNS query for the SPF policy of agrokor.hr, 2) a DNS query for
the MX record of agrokor.hr, 3) a DNS query for the A record of muhlo.agrokor.hr,
4) a DNS query for the A record of lobel.agrokor.hr. Thus, the total number of DNS
lookups of SPF idea.rs is 4.
To obtain the maximum DNS lookups, we count the total nodes in a Gd , excluding
the root node and the leaf nodes, as shown in Eq 4.3

Gd max DN S = |Gd nodes| − 1(rootnode) − |Gd leaf nodes|

Figure 4.4: Gidea.rs
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(4.3)

4.2.4

Normalized DNS Lookup Range

We can quantify the eﬃciency of SPF d by analyzing the diﬀerence between the min DNS and
max DNS of Gd , as shown in Eq 4.4.

Gd DN S Lookup Range =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ Gd M ax DN S−Gd M in DN S
Gd M ax DN S

⎪
⎪
⎩0

if Gd M ax DN S > 0

(4.4)

otherwise

Any range other than zero simply implies there is a diﬀerence between the min DNS
and the max DNS. However, a normalized DNS lookup range of zero could mean that either
the number of DNS lookups incurred by the SPF validator is the same for both min DNS and
max DNS, or that no DNS lookups are required for validation. Hence, any SPF policy that
can be evaluated without a single DNS lookup can be viewed as a more eﬃcient SPF policy.
4.2.5

Duplicate IP Nodes (DIP)

It is possible that a single IP address might appear more than once in a policy, after expansion.
The number of duplicate IP nodes considers the possibility of multiple instances of the same
IP addresses in SPF d . Duplicate authorized hosts for a given SPF d are found by tracking any
two or more leaf nodes with the same IP address (refer to Figure 4.5 with nodes highlighted
in red). Finding any duplicate IP nodes found within SPF d provides an opportunity for an
organization to simplify its SPF policy. The simplifying process can include removing any
unnecessary term(s) or deleting a reference domain that evaluated to the same IP address,
thus reducing policy complexity and improving policy eﬃciency.
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Figure 4.5: Gidea.rs
4.2.6

Third-Party Organizations

The owner of the domain, usually an organization, can either choose to setup its own email
servers to send and receive email, outsource to a third-party email provider (third-party
organization) to send and receive email on their behalf, or employ a mixture of both. In an
SPF policy, the notion of outsourcing is accomplished by referencing a third-party organization
as the reference domain of the include mechanism or redirect modifier.
To identify the organizations that contribute to the policy of a given domain, we
employ a heuristic approach. This approach is based on the assumption that an organization
that administers multiple domains will consistently use the same suﬃx in the email address
for their administrative contact. The email address is found in the RNAME (responsible
name) field of the start of authority (SOA) record for the domain. The SOA record contains
administrative details associated with a given domain. To find the total number of unique
third-party organizations in Gd , we: 1) retrieve the SOA DNS record and extract the email
suﬃx of the RNAME for the base domain as well as each reference domain of the include
mechanism or redirect modifier; and 2) count the number of unique email suﬃxes extracted.
We then subtract one from the total, to account for the base organization domain in Gd .
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Figure 4.6: Gexample.com
We illustrate this using Gexample.com (Figure 4.6) as an example. The nodes corresponding to the include mechanism or redirect modifier are highlighted in red, as is
the root node. The number of third-party organizations is calculated as follows:
• The email suﬃx of the RNAME for the base domain example.com is example.com.
• The email suﬃx of the RNAME for the reference domain of the include mechanism
example2.com is example2.com.
• The email suﬃx of the RNAME for the reference domain of the include mechanism
example3.com is example3.com.
• The third-party organization count is 2 because there are 3 unique email suﬃxes
extracted less one to account for the base organization domain.
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4.2.7

Percentage of Outsourcing

While understanding the number of third-party organizations contributing to a policy is
important, so is understanding the extent to which they contribute. The percentage of
outsourcing works in conjunction with the third-party organization count and is used to
reveal the total percentage of third-party organizations authorized hosts contributing to
SPF d .
To calculate the percentage of outsourcing in Gd for a given leaf node we: 1) identify the
nearest ancestor node in the hierarchy representing an include mechanism or redirect
modifier, if any; 2) determine whether the reference domain for the nearest ancestor node is
a third-party organization; and 3) increment the outsourcing count if the returned status is
true. The last step for this process is to tally the percentage of outsourcing after all Gd ’s
leaf nodes have been processed, i.e., by dividing the total number of leaf nodes under any
third-party organization by the total number of leaf nodes.
Using Gexample.com (Figure 4.7) as an example, we calculate its percentage of outsourcing
as follows:
• Given the leaf node of IP 2001:db8::10, there is no nearest ancestor node in its hierarchy
representing an include mechanism or redirect modifier. Thus, the next leaf node
is considered.
• Given the leaf node of IP 192.0.2.30, the nearest ancestor node in its hierarchy representing an include mechanism or redirect modifier is the reference domain, example3.com
of the include mechanism.
1. The third-party organization status of example3.com returns true, i.e., that the
organization associated with example3.com is diﬀerent than that of example.com.
2. Outsourcing count is increase by one.
• The percentage of outsourcing after all the Gd ’s leaf nodes have been processed is one
out of seven or 14.29%.
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As it pertains to policy maintenance, we expect that complete outsourcing of email
services to a third-party organization might result in a lower complexity. This is because the
setup and maintenance of any software and/or hardware related to the email infrastructure
has been delegated to a professional third-party email provider. On the other hand, a mixture
of in-house and outsourced email services employed by an organization might increase policy
complexity due to managing diﬀerent mailing systems with a single SPF policy.

Figure 4.7: Gexample.com
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Chapter 5
Measurement Study

In order to assess the complexity of SPF policies currently deployed, we applied our
metrics to the top 525,166 domains of Alexa top sites as of March 2018. Refer to table
5.1, out of the domains we analyzed, only 46.35% contained valid SPF records that allow
email. The rest of the domains either had no SPF policy, had published their SPF policy
incorrectly (e.g., had more than one SPF record per domain, published with a type SPF
instead of a type TXT, or contained syntax errors that prevented the record from being parsed),
or had a valid SPF configuration of "v=spf1 -all" (no email should be sent from the
domains). In addition, there were 18 valid SPF records that went into a recursive loop due to
careless usage of the include mechanism. Refer to Table 5.1 for the percentage breakdown.

Short Description
Valid SPF Policy
No SPF policy
SPF policy with errors
Valid SPF policy ”v=spf1 -all”
Valid SPF policy with recursive loop

Breakdown (%)
46.345%
46.355%
6.892%
0.404%
0.004%

Table 5.1: Overall SPF Policy Status
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5.1

IP Nodes
Percentile
25
50
75
95
100

IPv4
4
14
30
60
1830

IPv6
0
1
5
11
1819

Ratio (IPv4 / IPv6)
Undefined
14
6
5.5
1.006

Table 5.2: Percentile of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites

Figure 5.1: Cumulative distribution function(CDF) of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes for SPF policies
of Alexa Top Sites
Half of the policies we analyzed included more than 14 IPv4 nodes, and 25% included
more than 30 IPv4 nodes. In contrast to the number of IPv4 nodes, half of the policies
included more than one IPv6 node, while 25% included more than 5 IPv6 nodes. Thus,
there are, on average, more IPv4 than IPv6 nodes. Therefore, we might infer that the IPv6
adoption rate among the evaluated policies is low when compared to IPv4 adoption.
The amount of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes at the 100th percentile, 1830 and 1819 respectively, is more than 30 times greater than the amount of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes in the 95th
percentile. The high number of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes at the 100th percentile is caused
by a single policy, SPF modbis.pl (see Figure 5.2). SPF modbis.pl uses the reference domain
spf.iai-sa.com twice for its two include mechanisms. A single use of the reference
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domain spf.iai-sa.com resolved to over nine hundred unique IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
and calling it two times doubles the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to over a thousand. This
resulted in an exceptionally high number of IPv4 and IPv6 nodes, as reflected in Table 5.2.

Figure 5.2: SPF modbis.pl
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5.2

Third-Party Organization and Percentage of Outsourcing

Third-Party
Organizations
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Percentage of SPF
Policies
38.4445%
35.596%
12.9266%
8.1334%
3.3428%
1.0695%
0.332%
0.0966%

Third-Party
Organizations
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Percentage of SPF
Policies
0.0308%
0.0185%
0.0037%
0.0033%
0.00016%
0.0004%
0.0004%

Table 5.3: Breakdown of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites by number of third-party organizations

Figure 5.3: Histogram showing the percentage of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites for each
count of third-party organizations
Table 5.3 shows the percentage breakdown of the number of SPF policies based on the
number of third-party organizations. Figure 5.4 shows a plot of the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the percentage of outsourcing.
We observe that nearly 62% of the analyzed policies employ some degree of outsourcing.
We also observe that approximately 23% of domains exhibit complete outsourcing of their
policies (i.e., percentage of outsourcing = 1.0), 38.45% of domains exhibit no outsourcing of
their policies (i.e., percentage of outsourcing = 0.0), and the rest of the domains outsource
their policies partially (i.e., percentage of outsourcing is greater than 0 and less than 1). A
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Figure 5.4: CDF of percentage of outsourcing found in SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites

Figure 5.5: Histogram showing the percentage of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites for each
count of third-party organizations, for fully outsourced policies
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Figure 5.6: Area chart showing the count of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites over the
percentage of sourcing, for partially outsourced policies
high third-party organization count in a given SPF policy does not necessary imply that its
policy is fully outsourced. For example, one of the SPF policies we analyzed has a third-party
organization count of 14, but its outsourcing percentage is 97.1%. As a matter of fact,
we observe that roughly 75% of domains with fully outsourced policies have only a single
third-party organization (see Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.6 shows an area chart of the outsourcing percentage of domains that exhibit
partial outsourcing. The mean and median for the percentages of outsourcing are 0.739 and
0.79, respectively. Additionally, for about 85% of partially outsourced policies, the majority
of derived IP addresses (at least 52%) are associated with third-party organizations.
We observe that most of the domains (about 62%) engage in some sort of outsourcing
as reflected in their SPF policies. By correlating the percentage of outsourcing with other
metrics such as DIP, min DNS, max DNS, and normalized DNS lookup range, we can study
the subtleties of how outsourcing might impact DIP, min DNS, max DNS, and normalized
DNS lookup range.

32

5.3

DIP

Percentile

Overall DIP
(Category 1)

DIP of SPF Policies
with No Outsourcing (Category 2)

25
50
75
95
100

0
0
1
3
1808

0
1
1
2
57

DIP of the
Partially
Outsourced
SPF Policies
(Category 3)
0
0
1
8
1808

DIP of the Fully
Outsourced
SPF
Policies (Category
4)
0
0
0
0
83

Table 5.4: Percentile of DIP of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites

Figure 5.7: CDF of DIP for SPF policies of Alexa Top Sites
There are 4 categories presented in Table 5.4 Category 1 contains the statistical
measure of DIP, as percentiles, of all evaluated SPF policies. Category 2 includes only the
DIP of SPF policies with no outsourcing. Category 3 represents the DIP of SPF policies that
employed partial outsourcing. Category 4 consists of DIP with fully outsourced SPF policies.
Figure 5.7 shows the CDF of the overall number of DIP found in each policy. There is
a huge disparity in the number of DIP between the 95th and the 100th percentile policies.
However, by correlating the number of DIPs with the percentage of outsourcing, we realized
that 1) the DIP count of 1808 belongs to an SPF policy with partially outsourced configuration
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and 2) the max DIP count for categories 2 and 4 are respectively, 28 and 83 times higher
than the rest of the 95th percentile policies in their corresponding categories.
SPF redetiradentes.com.br , SPF epinokio.pl and SPF reliancemoney.com are the originator policies
for the 100th percentile DIP count in categories 2, 3 and 4 respectively (see Figure 5.8, 5.9
and 5.10). The reason for such a high count in each case is the use of two include mechanisms pointing to the same reference domain in both SPF redetiradentes.com.br and SPF epinokio.pl .
SPF reliancemoney.com , on the other hand, uses two include mechanisms, but each include
mechanism points to a unique reference domain, and both resolve to the same set of IP
addresses.
To resolve DIPs, an SPF administrator might choose to remove one of the redundant include mechanisms or take other appropriate actions, as listed in section 4.2.5.

Figure 5.8: SPF redetiradentes.com.br

Figure 5.9: SPF epinokio.pl

Figure 5.10: SPF reliancemoney.com
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5.4

Min DNS
Percentile

25
50
75
95
100

Min DNS of SPF Min DNS of the
Policies with No Partially
OutOutsourcing (Cate- sourced SPF Poligory 1)
cies (Category 2)
0
0
1
1
1
2
2
3
9
5

Min DNS of the
Fully Out-sourced
SPF Policies (Category 3)
1
2
2
3
5

Table 5.5: Percentile of Min DNS of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites

Typically, a min DNS of zero denotes the use of either ip4 or ip6 as the left most
term in the SPF policy. This is usually an indication of a more eﬃcient SPF policy since it
does not require any DNS lookups for the derivation of IP addresses. On the other hand, a
fully outsourced policy should have at least a min DNS of 1. To qualify as a fully outsourced
policy: 1) all the terms in the SPF policy should either be an include mechanism or a
redirect modifier; 2) its reference domain is associated with a third-party organization;
and 3) all its authorized hosts stem from the third-party organizations.
In categories 1 and 2 of Table 5.5, we observe that 25% of the policies do not require
any DNS lookups for IP address derivation, while 95% of the policies are guaranteed to
obtain an IP address to match against within two DNS lookups. However, there is one
policy, SPF hubspot.com , in category 1 with a min DNS that is four times higher than the 95th
percentile policies in category 1. This was caused by the use of include mechanism, as the
left-most term in the base domain SPF policy, as well as in all of its subsequent reference
domains’ SPF policies.
There were nine SPF policies under category 3 with a min DNS of zero, deviating
from the established norm of having at least a min DNS of 1 for a full outsource policy. These
policies exhibited this behavior because they used the include mechanism as their left-most
term in the policy (see Figure 5.11). However, the SPF policy of the reference domain of
the include mechanism had only one term in its entire configuration: "v=spf1 -all",
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meaning no email should be sent from the domain. Such unexpected configuration caused the
program to return from that particular subtree, and a leaf node was generated to represent
the include mechanism.

Figure 5.11: Gallout.org
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5.5

Max DNS

Figure 5.12: Line chart showing the percentage of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites for
diﬀerent value of max DNS, considering only policies with no outsourcing

Figure 5.13: Line chart showing the percentage of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites for
diﬀerent value of max DNS, considering only partially outsourced policies
Max DNS tracks the maximum possible DNS lookups that a SPF validator might
need to issue for any given policy. About 95% of the SPF policies exhibiting no outsourcing
or complete outsourcing have a max DNS that is less than or equal to 7 and 9, respectively
(see Figure 5.12, 5.14). This means a majority of the SPF policies with no outsourcing or
complete outsourcing are being resource conscious by minimizing their policies’ impact on
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Figure 5.14: Line chart showing the percentage of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites for
diﬀerent value of max DNS, considering only fully outsourced policies
the DNS infrastructure. This can be done by limiting the maximum number of DNS queries
that an SPF validator might need to issue during evaluation.
On the other hand, max DNS is more sparse for the partially outsourced SPF policies
(see Figure 5.13), with only 50% of those policies having a max DNS that is less than or equal
to 8. To minimize the impact of SPF policies on the DNS resources, any organization that
partially outsourced its email infrastructure must consider the potential DNS lookups, both
those associated with its own organization and those associated with third-party organizations,
when designing its SPF policy.
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5.6

Normalized DNS Lookup Range
Normalized
DNS
Lookup Range
0

SPF Policies with
No
Outsourcing(Category 1)
28.47%

Partially
Out- Fully
Outsourced SPF Poli- sourced SPF Policies (Category 2)
cies(Category 3)
0.49%
25.99%

Table 5.6: Normalized DNS lookup range of zero of SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites

As mentioned in section 4.2.4, there are two scenarios where a normalized DNS lookup
range of zero can occur. In the first scenario, the min DNS is equal to the max DNS, and
the min DNS and max DNS are both greater than zero. In the second, the min DNS is
equal to the max DNS, but the min DNS and max DNS are both zero. This can only occur
if all the terms in the policy consist only of ip4 and/or ip6. Refer to figure 5.6.2 for a
second scenario example. The second scenario is considered to be more eﬃcient since the
SPF policies can be evaluated by an SPF validator without any DNS queries. Thus, any
organization that wishes to maximize its SPF policy eﬃciency should only use ip4 and/or
ip6 term to construct their SPF policy.
From Table 5.6, we observe that fewer than 0.5% of the SPF policies from the partially
outsourced category have a normalized DNS lookup range of zero. Whereas 28.47% of policies
with on outsourcing and 25.99% of fully outsource policies have a normalized DNS lookup
range of zero.
Of the 28.47% of SPF policies that don’t outsource and have a normalized DNS lookup
range of zero, 46.33% of them fall in the first scenario — that is, the min DNS and max
DNS are both greater than zero. The remaining 53.67% fall under the more eﬃcient second
scenario. This is very diﬀerent compared to fully outsourced and partially outsourced SPF
policies, where 100% of policies with a normalized DNS lookup range of zero fall under the
first scenario.
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5.7

Historical Trends

As mentioned in Section 4, SPF policies must be maintained continuously to keep up with
organizational changes. In this section we seek to understand the general SPF deployment
trend through the use of historical SPF policies. To facilitate this study, the SPF data of top
100,000 of Alexa Top Sites was obtained through the use of Farsight Securitys DNSDB for
the years 2011 to 2017. We calculated the yearly median and mean based on the metric of
IP nodes, min DNS, max DNS, third-party organizations, and percentage of outsourcing into
a time series graph to capture any changes in the policy over time.
5.7.1

IP Nodes

Figure 5.15: Time Plot of average and median number of IP Nodes in SPF policies for Alexa
Top Sites from 2011-2017
Figure 5.15 shows the time plot of average and median IP nodes (both IPv4 and IPv6
nodes) of the yearly aggregated SPF policies. There has been an upward trend for both mean
and median over the period of six years. This upward trend demonstrates: 1) an overall
increase in the number of IP addresses; and 2) a growth in both the upper and lower 50th
percentiles of the SPF policies. Thus, this implies that policies have become more complex
over the analyzed time periods.
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5.7.2

Min DNS and Max DNS

Figure 5.16: Time plot of average and median number of Min DNS in SPF policies for Alexa
Top Sites from 2011-2017

Figure 5.17: Time plot of average and median number of Max DNS in SPF policies for Alexa
Top Sites from 2011-2017
Figure 5.16 shows the time plot of min DNS. While we observed an upward trend in
the mean, the median remained constant over the six-year period. This indicates the increase
is associated with the upper 50th percentiles of the policies.
Figure 5.17 shows the time plot of max DNS. There is some fluctuation in the mean,
but the overall trend is upward. The mean is consistently higher than the median. Thus, the
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SPF policies of the lower 50th percentile are consistently skewed toward the lower end of the
max DNS.
5.7.3

Outsourcing

Figure 5.18: Time Plot of average and median number of count of third-party organizations
in SPF policies for Alexa Top Sites from 2011-2017

Figure 5.19: Time Plot of average and median number of percentage of outsourcing in SPF
policies for Alexa Top Sites from 2011-2017
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Overall, we saw an increasing trend for outsourcing (see figure 5.18 and 5.19). In 2011,
only 30% of the SPF policies engage in outsourcing. However, that number increased to 64%
in 2017 as more policies have embraced outsourcing.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis, we have developed a graph based model to capture the essence of an
SPF policy and have provided organizations with tools and metrics to quantify the eﬃciency
of their SPF deployment.
Through the use of metrics, we noticed the IPv6 adoption rate was significantly
lower than IPv4. We also observed that about 62% of the policies we analyzed employed
some degree of outsourcing on their email infrastructure. Also, 15.28% of SPF policies were
considered to be eﬃcient since the evaluation of a sender IP address can be done without
issuing a single DNS lookup. We also investigated the organizational network complexity by
studying historical trends using metrics to measure the growth of IP address space and the
adoption of SPF policy outsourcing.
To improve the eﬃciency of an SPF policy, an organization can use metrics such as
DIP to eliminate any duplication of IP address found within a SPF policy. With the help of
min DNS and max DNS, a resource conscious organization can choose to reduce its load on
the SPF validators and DNS servers by cutting back on the number of DNS lookups through
a redesign of its SPF policy.
Future work includes expanding our model to more accurately handle cases such as
calculating min DNS when there is an include directive that yields no IP addresses, as described
in section 5.4. To expand the scope of our analysis, future work could include performing
a thorough investigation of all the errors documented in RFC 7208. We could analyze the
impact an error has on min DNS and perhaps shed some light on the most frequently made
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errors. Error analysis should explore the possibility of equipping an organization with the
means to fix its SPF policy error(s), thus improving the quality of SPF deployment rate.
Additionally, a better understanding of the SPF validators′ behaviors can be done
by conducting a measurement study against the proposed RFC 7208 standard. Such a measurement study might uncover diﬀerences between the proposed standard and the behaviors
of an actual SPF validator (i.e. operational processing, evaluation, and error-handling of
mechanisms and modifiers). This essentially equips an organization with knowledge of the
common validation practices adopted by the SPF validators and aids the organization in
designing an eﬃcient, all-inclusive, anti-spoofing email policy to protect its domain from
being spoofed.
We believe that the model and metrics herein presented can help organizations not only
with maintaining the correctness of SPF policies, but also with identifying and minimizing
complexity. We hope that these eﬀorts will aid the network administrator to not only design
an eﬀective, but also an eﬃcient SPF policy that uses resources carefully and achieves its
purpose of protecting the domain from compromise.
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